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Abstract
Despite scholarly and popular hopes and predictions that the 2011 Arab Spring would mean the end of
authoritarianism and the onset of democracy across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, anti-
regime uprisings only occurred in a small subset of MENA nations. This thesis aims to address the puzzle of
the Arab Spring’s partial contagion; the main interest of this work is to explore why the six Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries in particular escaped the Arab Spring virtually unscathed. The hypothesis offered
here argues that the regional variation in the Arab Spring uprisings can be explained by labor force
demographics in the GCC. Dominated by non-Arab, Asian migrant laborers, GCC workforces depend on the
exploitative kafala sponsorship system that ties migrant workers to Gulf employers in a mode of quasi-
indentured servitude. The kafala system and the labor force demographics it has created in the GCC are
significant to the Arab Spring uprisings in two ways: first, migrant workers strike and protest their living and
working conditions often, and suffer harsh consequences as a result. Gulf migrant workers’ collective action
and the punishments that they endure operated as a mode of demonstration effect that deterred Gulf citizens
from engaging in similar behavior against their respective governments. Second, Asian migrant workers
recruited through the kafala system have supplanted intraregional labor imports from poorer MENA nations
such as Egypt and Tunisia; the preference of GCC employers for Asian migrant workers has meant increases
in unemployment in non-GCC MENA countries, which contributed to the mass discontentment and lack of
upward social mobility that resulted in upheaval in these nations and some others, including Libya, Yemen,
and Syria. The economic preconditions of Gulf countries – major oil and construction industries, high GDP,
and low domestic unemployment – allow for the kafala system to exist. Unlike existing explanations for
regional variation during the Arab Spring uprisings, including hereditary succession, the use of social media,
cultural diversity and oil wealth, the demographic makeup of countries’ labor forces consistently separates
GCC nations from those that experienced mass uprising and unrest. This thesis marshals quantitative
evidence and a selection of case studies of specific countries – Libya, Bahrain, and Qatar – to demonstrate
why labor force demographics matter to political behavior and outcomes in the context of the Arab Spring.
Ultimately, the exigencies of the GCC labor markets make complete, meaningful, or sustained transition away
from authoritarianism toward democracy unlikely in the entirety of the MENA region in the foreseeable
future.
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Abstract 
 
 Despite scholarly and popular hopes and predictions that the 2011 Arab Spring would 
mean the end of authoritarianism and the onset of democracy across the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, anti-regime uprisings only occurred in a small subset of MENA nations. 
This thesis aims to address the puzzle of the Arab Spring’s partial contagion; the main interest of 
this work is to explore why the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in particular 
escaped the Arab Spring virtually unscathed. The hypothesis offered here argues that the regional 
variation in the Arab Spring uprisings can be explained by labor force demographics in the GCC. 
Dominated by non-Arab, Asian migrant laborers, GCC workforces depend on the exploitative 
kafala sponsorship system that ties migrant workers to Gulf employers in a mode of quasi-
indentured servitude. The kafala system and the labor force demographics it has created in the 
GCC are significant to the Arab Spring uprisings in two ways: first, migrant workers strike and 
protest their living and working conditions often, and suffer harsh consequences as a result. Gulf 
migrant workers’ collective action and the punishments that they endure operated as a mode of 
demonstration effect that deterred Gulf citizens from engaging in similar behavior against their 
respective governments. Second, Asian migrant workers recruited through the kafala system 
have supplanted intraregional labor imports from poorer MENA nations such as Egypt and 
Tunisia; the preference of GCC employers for Asian migrant workers has meant increases in 
unemployment in non-GCC MENA countries, which contributed to the mass discontentment and 
lack of upward social mobility that resulted in upheaval in these nations and some others, 
including Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The economic preconditions of Gulf countries – major oil 
and construction industries, high GDP, and low domestic unemployment – allow for the kafala 
system to exist. Unlike existing explanations for regional variation during the Arab Spring 
uprisings, including hereditary succession, the use of social media, cultural diversity and oil 
wealth, the demographic makeup of countries’ labor forces consistently separates GCC nations 
from those that experienced mass uprising and unrest. This thesis marshals quantitative evidence 
and a selection of case studies of specific countries – Libya, Bahrain, and Qatar – to demonstrate 
why labor force demographics matter to political behavior and outcomes in the context of the 
Arab Spring. Ultimately, the exigencies of the GCC labor markets make complete, meaningful, 
or sustained transition away from authoritarianism toward democracy unlikely in the entirety of 
the MENA region in the foreseeable future.  
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Stern 1 
Chapter I: The Puzzle  
Introduction 
 The self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010 
began a seemingly contagious regional mass social movement for political and socioeconomic 
change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Bouazizi, an unlicensed fruit peddler in 
Tunisia, doused himself in gasoline in response to “just one of the thousands of petty indignities 
Tunisians had been forced to swallow their whole lives;” this act “set in motion the region’s most 
tumultuous change for more than half a century.”1 Upheaval spread from Tunisia to Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen and Syria, unseating dictators and plunging countries into protracted civil conflict. 
Countries including Jordan, Algeria, Oman and Bahrain also experienced some milder anti-
government protests, but these demonstrations did not result in total upheaval or regime collapse. 
This regional tumult, born of demands for more representative government and better economic 
opportunities for upward social mobility,2 was termed the “Arab Spring.”3  
 The driving force behind the Arab Spring was mass discontentment with political and 
socioeconomic status quos. Historically, the MENA region has been dominated by oppressive 
non-democratic governments; modern authoritarian regimes remain largely concentrated in the 
MENA region, and these governments have survived without democracy threatening to gain a 
serious foothold until growing youth populations began to demand more dignified livelihoods 
and more job opportunities in 2011.4  According to the United Nations, people aged 15-24 
(“youth”) are a dominant age bracket in the MENA region, and unemployment among youth in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 1 Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring (New York: Bloomsbury 
Press, 2013), 42. 
 2 Danahar, The New Middle East, 6.   
 3 Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor, "Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? 
Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, no. 
2 (Spring 2012): 167, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41495309. 
 4 Danahar, The New Middle East, 6.  
Stern 2 
MENA is the highest of any world region.5 Frustrated with little or no potential for upward social 
mobility due to a general lack of employment opportunities, youth in MENA nations “[became] 
the force behind the historical uprisings in the region, demanding change.”6 Youth led charges 
against “‘unpopular repressive leader[s]’” in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen, 
overthrowing autocrats in the first three of those nations and igniting a prolonged civil war in 
Syria.  
 Yet, despite scholarly and popular predictions that the contagion of protest would 
eventually reach every MENA regime, effectively spelling the end of authoritarianism and the 
onset of meaningful, sustainable democratic development across the region, this did not become 
a reality.7 Even in countries where mass protest and violent upheaval took place, calls for 
political liberalization have failed to manifest as democracy.8 While protests in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya successfully unseated existing governments, well-functioning, thriving democracies 
have not yet materialized; authoritarian collapse on its own “is not a sufficient condition for such 
[democratic] transition.”9  
 Perhaps even more interestingly, several prominent authoritarian regimes not only 
survived, but experienced virtually no popular anti-government uprising. As Eva Bellin notes, 
“The limited geographical reach of the Arab Spring is one of the most important observations to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 5 Farzaneh Roudi, Youth Population and Employment in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Opportunity or Challenge? (New York: The United Nations, 2011), accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/p06_roudi.pdf. 
 6 Farzaneh Roudi, Youth Population and Employment in the Middle East and North Africa.  
 7 Shadi Hamid, Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, in Danahar, The New Middle East, 28-
29.   
 8 "The Arab World: Tethered by History," The Economist, July 5, 2014,  accessed December 10, 
2014, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21606286-failures-arab-spring-were-long-time-making-
tethered-history. 
 9 Eva Bellin, "A Modest Transformation: Political Change in the Arab World after the 'Arab 
Spring,'" in The Arab Spring: Will it Lead to Democratic Transitions?, ed. Clement Henry and Jang Ji-
Hyang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 37.  
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make…While every country in the region had citizens receptive to the contagion of the 
‘awakening,’ in fact, the vast majority of Arab countries successfully avoided the mass 
mobilization of protest.”10 In particular, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations – Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – are a specific 
collection of states – united by geographic proximity and economic practices and interests – in 
the region that escaped the Arab Spring virtually unscathed. However, GCC countries have much 
in common with countries such as Egypt and Libya, which were overwhelmed by mass 
mobilization and anti-regime uprisings; all had authoritarian, non-democratic governments, and 
the GCC member countries and Libya are all oil-rich states. The goal of this thesis is to address 
this puzzle: Why did the Arab Spring unevenly affect the MENA region? Why did some of these 
authoritarian states experience violent government overthrow, chaos, and prolonged civil war 
while others remained virtually unaffected by the “contagion” of the Arab Spring – essentially, 
what explains the “partial contagion” that appears to have occurred? 
 This thesis hypothesizes that the answer to this puzzle lies in labor force demographics. 
All of the six GCC countries have sizable non-Arab, Asian migrant worker populations; this is an 
economic variable common to all six GCC nations that, unlike oil, is not also present in countries 
that experienced uprising and overthrow (e.g. Libya). On the whole, these nations did not 
undergo appreciable unrest or massive anti-government social movements, and all of them rely 
heavily on exploiting cheap and reliable South Asian migrant labor on major scales. All of these 
nations, unlike MENA countries that underwent substantial anti-government uprising, and in 
some cases, regime overthrow, employ non-Arab migrant workers in construction and industrial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 10  Eva Bellin, "A Modest Transformation: Political Change in the Arab World after the 'Arab 
Spring,'" 35.  
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development-related projects. Essentially, the GCC labor force dominated by non-Arab, mostly 
South Asian migrant workers, is largely responsible for these nations’ relative lack of uprising.11  
 As this paper will explain, these foreign workers’ employment in such huge numbers 
helps to explain variation in unrest during the Arab Spring via several interrelated causal 
mechanisms: first, the combination of low domestic unemployment and workforces dominated 
by foreign labor in the GCC indicates certain fiscal preconditions that both attract and sustain 
massive migrant populations, and levels of fiscal stability that diminish discontent (e.g. 
employment opportunities are not lacking relative to other MENA nations with much higher 
domestic unemployment rates and negligible or zero migrant worker populations). Second, these 
migrant workers strike, in direct contravention of anti-union statutes in GCC countries, and are 
often punished – imprisoned, threatened with violence, and/or deported – for their collective 
action.12 By way of demonstration effect, migrant laborers’ strikes and the ensuing consequences 
effectively diminished the likelihood of GCC citizens taking up similar behavior against their 
respective governments.  
 
Research Methodology  
 This thesis adopts a qualitative and quantitative data-driven approach to explore and 
assess several arguments concerning the patterns of Arab Spring uprisings across the region. 
First, the theory of protest diffusion will be discussed to explore why the Arab Spring spread to a 
select few MENA nations while others completely avoided protest. The following section will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 11 Andrzej Kapiszewski, Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries, Beirut: 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, 2006, 3, accessed April 27, 
2014, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/expert/11/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf 
 12 Dan McDougal, "Tourists Targeted as Dubai Workers Stage Revolt: 'Exploited' Migrant 
Labourers Take Their Protest to the Luxury Malls They Built," The Guardian Weekly (Dubai), April 14, 
2006, accessed December 10, 2014, LexisNexis Academic. 
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review existing hypotheses in the relevant literature that aims to explain variation in the Arab 
Spring. Next, the labor force demographics hypothesis will be presented, and data on labor force 
demographics in the GCC nations, in conjunction with other fiscal health indicators, including 
unemployment rates collected from the World Bank, will be offered in support of this theory. In 
addition to fiscal indicators and labor force demographics, analysis of data gathered from the 
Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) on labor-related and anti-government 
protests in the GCC and other selected MENA nations further supports the hypothesis that 
protests did not diffuse to the GCC in any sustained or meaningful way due to the demonstration 
effect of migrant labor uprisings. This data supports the contention that both the demonstration 
effect and preexisting economic conditions that attracted non-Arab migrant workers to the GCC 
meaningfully explain political variation across the MENA region during the Arab Spring.   
 After the literature and data are reviewed and analyzed, this thesis presents three case 
studies of countries with varying experiences of the Arab Spring. These nations – Libya, 
Bahrain, and Qatar – were selected because each demonstrates useful variation in the 
independent and dependent variables of interest. The quantitative data marshaled here has its 
limitations, and therefore case studies are useful to draw out the analysis. Libya is used to 
address the failure of existing hypotheses and explanations for why certain regimes collapsed 
and others remained unharmed during the course of the Arab Spring. Libya correlates with the 
Gulf nations in terms of several independent variables, such as oil wealth, but Libya is missing a 
non-Arab migrant labor force. Bahrain is profiled in anticipation of potential criticism of the 
hypothesis advanced in this thesis. Bahrain could be read as an exception to the general theory 
that this paper argues explains regional variation in the Arab Spring uprisings because Bahrain 
experienced some collective organization against the government, but protests were quickly put 
Stern 6 
down with the help of the Saudi Arabian government.13 The exceptional aspects of the Bahraini 
case will be explored to show that the experience of this one country, while it departs from the 
GCC on the whole, does not undermine the overarching hypothesis presented in this thesis. 
Finally, Qatar is the positive case that illustrates how labor force demographics influenced 
political activity and outcomes in the MENA region during the Arab Spring. Qatar has an 
overwhelming Asian migrant labor force and experienced no mass protest during the Arab 
Spring. The final section of this thesis concludes and discusses implications of this work.  
 
 
Chapter II: Theoretical Approaches to Protest Diffusion  
 
“Rebellion is a very complicated matter that cannot be reduced to a few variables.”14 
 
 
Overview   
 
  Mohammed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation symbolized the desperation of people 
throughout the MENA region; the very public and publicized death of a poor Tunisian fruit 
vendor in turn led to a much broader, long-term “fight against corrupt regimes, unemployment 
and inflation.”15 First in Tunisia and then in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, autocrats faced 
credible threats and regimes collapsed under pressure from populations that no longer remained 
silent in the face of social, political and economic repression. In the space of one year, several 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 13 Ahmed Kanna, "A Politics of Non-Recognition? Biopolitics of Arab Gulf Worker Protests in 
the Year of Uprisings," Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 4, no. 1 (May 2012): 152, 
accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Interface-4-1-Kanna.pdf; "Bahrain Profile," BBC News, September 19, 
2013, accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14540571.  
 14 Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 79.  
 15 Mohamed A.J. Althani, The Arab Spring and the Gulf States: Time to Embrace 
Change (London: Profile Books, 2012), 69.  
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leaders were overthrown and in Syria, a civil war had begun in the name of liberalization and 
reform.  
 On the whole, mass mobilization and anti-regime protests during the Arab Spring can be 
explained by general fatigue with autocratic governments; the countries that experienced major 
unrest and regime collapse were similar in “their aging leaders and corrupt and ineffectual 
governments [and] their educated, unemployed and disaffected youth.”16 After Bouazizi’s death, 
protests began in Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s Tunisia, where the government “tightly restricted 
free expression and political parties.”17 Labor strikes by disenchanted and desperate Tunisians 
“fueled protests;” the “unusually personalist and predatory” nature of Ben Ali’s corruption was 
no longer sustainable, and Ben Ali fled the country amidst the growing unrest.18 In Tunisia, the 
military’s ironic inaction also played an important role; the military’s “refusal to support Ben Ali 
contributed to the country’s revolution.”19  
 A similar dynamic occurred in Egypt: the military “sided with the protesters” and helped 
to oust Hosni Mubarak’s long-standing regime.20 The spread of anti-regime fervor from Tunisia 
to Egypt can be explained partly by demonstration effect and by cultural and socioeconomic 
similarities: in both countries, an under- and unemployed youth population grew desperate. Just 
as labor protests grew into politicized anti-regime movements in Tunisia, in Egypt, “the 
government’s deteriorating ability to provide basic services and seeming indifference to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 16 Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 3, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23039401. 
 17 Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 3.  
 18 Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 3-4. 
 19 Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 3.  
 20 F. Gregory Gause, III, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of 
Authoritarian Stability," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011): 84, accessed December 15, 2014, 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora90&div=67&id=&page=.  
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widespread unemployment and poverty alienated tens of millions of Egyptians.”21 Egypt’s 
“bulging” youth population with little or no opportunity for upward social mobility and 
seemingly zero employment prospects drove them to the streets.22 As a former labor-exporting 
country to the GCC, the “deliberate reduction by the GCC of workers from the Arab region and 
growing preference for South Asian workers” directly affected Egyptian youth searching for 
employment.23 The ramifications of this shift in labor preference and subsequent labor force 
demographics in the GCC, and their explanatory power regarding the Arab Spring, are discussed 
in a later section.  
 Protests and regime collapse in Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, discussed in more detail in 
the case study portion of this thesis, were similar to Egypt and Tunisia in their ousting of a long-
standing, corrupt autocrat, by demanding “jobs, services, and an end to the mafia-like state that 
had terrorized and humiliated [Libyans] for decades.”24 However, what differed in Libya was the 
role played by “cleavages of kinship and region.”25 This is significant because the military in 
Libya splintered in the face of protest; some units remained loyal to the Gaddafi family, while 
others “defected to the opposition, stayed on the sidelines, or just [went] home.”26 The loss of 
control over the military meant that preempting and putting down protests when they erupted 
became increasingly difficult for the civilian regime.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 21 Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 4.  
 22 Barry Mirkin, Arab Spring: Demographics in a Region in Transition, Arab Human 
Development Report (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2013), 10, accessed April 27, 
2014, http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdrps/AHDR%20ENG%20Arab%20Spring% 
20Mirkinv3.pdf.  
 23 Mirkin, Arab Spring: Demographics in a Region in Transition, 17.  
 24 Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012), 2.  
 25 Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 6.  
 26 Gause, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring,” 84.  
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 Libyans distrusted not only their tyrannical government, but one another, leading to a 
protracted civil war: “The revolution in Libya was unique among those of the Arab Spring 
because it was absolute.”27 Protests that, as in Tunisia and Egypt, began as nonviolent 
demonstrations, escalated after Gaddafi “launched a brutal crackdown” against his own people.28 
This led to an all-out, violent civil war that spelled the implosion of the Libyan regime and civil 
society. Eventually, NATO involvement and intervention, a decision justified by humanitarian 
intentions, “enabled the Libyan opposition to overthrow one of the world's longest-ruling 
dictators.”29 
  Why the Arab Spring occurred when and where it did has preoccupied many scholars. 
As a region, MENA has perhaps the last remaining geographic concentration of authoritarian 
governments of varying degrees and kinds in the 21st century; with the exceptions of Israel and 
Turkey, all MENA nations successfully resisted, until, it appeared, the onset of the Arab Spring, 
the waves of democratization that swept the globe.30 The cultural, economic, and ethnic 
homogeneity of these nations has been offered as an explanation for both the staying power and 
the vulnerability of the regimes that remained virtually undisturbed until mass protests threatened 
to, and in some cases, actually did, unseat autocrats. That this reasoning has been employed to 
explain both regime resilience and collapse underlines its analytical weakness and thus, its 
inadequacy.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 27 Danahar, The New Middle East, 326-27, emphases in original.  
 28 Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya," Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2012, accessed February 8, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-
daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya. 
 29 Ibid.  
 30 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Spring 
1991): 13, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v002/2.2huntington.pdf. 
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 As the map below illustrates, the geographic proximity of and political, social and 
economic similarities among these countries helps to explain the spread of protests from Tunisia 
to Egypt and Libya, and eventually to Yemen and Syria. The notion of “cross-border Arab 
identity…a sense of common political identity despite living in 20 different states” has been 
offered to explain the rise and spread of anti-government protests across the MENA region 
during the Arab Spring.31 The problem with this argument is twofold: first, a shared Arab 
identity arguably extends beyond the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria and to 
countries that experienced little or no uprising, and second, similar to many existing hypotheses, 
it explains what did happen, but fails to consider what did not. That is a primary goal of this 
thesis. 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  
Source: http://www.worldmonitor.info/regions/graphics/maps/MENA.png. 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 31 Gause, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring,” 87-88.  
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Theoretical Underpinnings  
 The Arab Spring left scholars and the public alike with two puzzles. First, the fact that the 
Arab Spring occurred at all was puzzling, but that the contagion of revolution was incomplete at 
best, affecting a select few nations – and therefore failing to infect the entire region – was also 
unexpected. Literature on the Arab Spring notes that “observers imagined mass uprisings 
spreading rapidly across national boundaries to replace dictator after dictator with new leaders 
proclaiming a dawning era of democracy and freedom.”32 Why anti-government protests only 
occurred in a handful of MENA nations, and why the unrest missed some nations entirely, 
requires further explanation. It is first important to understand why the Arab Spring occurred 
when it did and why and how protest diffused to certain countries to understand regional 
variation in the Arab Spring uprisings. The theories of “regime change cascades” and collective 
action diffusion are useful to consider in this context.33  
 According to Hale, a regime change cascade “implies that earlier events in one country 
(the crossing of certain thresholds) tend to trigger or otherwise facilitate later ones in other 
countries.”34 The events of the Arab Spring seem to illustrate a manifestation of regional regime 
change cascade. Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the mass uprisings that followed in Tunisia set 
similar collective action in motion in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Essentially, the events in 
Tunisia fueled and even accelerated the uprisings that later took place and toppled some other 
governments in the region;35 the symbolism of Bouazizi’s very public, gruesome death and the 
mass movement that followed “serve[d] as a powerful reality-simplifying heuristic that… 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 32 Henry E. Hale, "Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions 
to the 2011 Arab Uprisings," Annual Review of Political Science16 (February 28, 2013): 332, accessed 
February 2, 2015, doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212204. 
 33 Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 332.  
 34 Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 333.  
 35 Ibid.   
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evoke[d] powerful emotions that prompt[ed] coordinated action.”36 By the logic of the 
demonstration effect, Bouazizi’s death and the uprisings that followed in Tunisia “triggered a 
major protest wave in Egypt;” the end of the Mubarak regime then fueled similar behavior by 
other anti-government, pro-liberation movements in Libya, Syria and Yemen.37 While this 
demonstration effect theory of regime change cascade helps to explain why protest diffused from 
Tunisia to other MENA nations, it also poses at least two more questions: why do individuals 
decide to participate in such mass movements, and why did certain countries and not others 
become “infected” with the contagion of anti-government protest?  
 Models of “collective behavior” – an umbrella term that includes protests and riots – help 
to explain why individuals engage in group action.38 The threshold level model of individual 
choice is useful for understanding the Arab Spring protests. According to Granovetter’s 
“‘threshold’ model of collective behavior,” individuals choose between action and inaction (in 
this case, whether or not to join an anti-government protest) based on when “the actual 
percentage of already active people starts to dominate her or his threshold level.”39 This means 
that individuals choose whether or not to engage in a certain behavior based on their own cost-
benefit analysis of joining others already engaged in that behavior. An individual’s threshold 
level is “the proportion of active others at which [the individual’s] net benefit of action (total 
benefit minus total cost) first becomes positive… the threshold approach can be interpreted as a 
rational choice model.”40 Every individual actor’s threshold level is different and unique to them; 
for some people, taking part in a mass movement in its early stages before thousands of others 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 36 Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 336.  
 37 Hale, “Regime Change Cascades,” 337.  
 38 Norman Braun, "Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion," Rationality and Society 7, no. 2 
(April 1995): 167, accessed February 2, 2015, doi:10.1177/1043463195007002005. 
 39 Braun, “Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion,” 167-68.  
 40 Braun, “Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion,” 171.  
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have joined may be more or less costly. Some individuals may prefer to be leaders of a 
movement and thus join earlier in the movement’s development, and therefore calculate that they 
have less to lose by engaging in this behavior at this stage. Others, however, may calculate that 
only once hundreds or thousands of people are already protesting that their benefits outweigh 
potential costs of joining an existing movement.  
 Thus, when a critical mass of individuals made the calculation that joining the anti-
government mass uprisings outweighed potential costs – a calculation brought powerfully to the 
forefront by Bouazizi’s death – collective action took place and diffused to other similarly 
situated populations. In the existing literature, there is agreement that “the threshold value 
represents a ‘safety in numbers’ aspect: the more fellow rebels or protesters, the less chance of 
being individually sanctioned by the regime.”41 In the case of the Arab Spring uprisings, the 
“exogenous event” of Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the mass action that followed clearly 
“influence[d] the benefit-cost considerations of individuals in the system… formerly nonactive 
persons [became] active.”42  
 It is helpful to consider what individual cost-benefit analyses may have looked like in 
terms of calculating what would be gained or lost by participating in mass uprisings. Individual 
cost-benefit analyses depend critically on threshold levels of engaging in certain behavior. As 
Petersen argues, “the more one detests the regime, the more likely one is to accept higher risk” in 
engaging in what would be contextually illegal or dangerous behavior.43 Individuals place 
subjective value on certain risks, thus varying their threshold level for participation; individuals 
that Petersen terms “hotheads or heroes” have very low (close to zero) threshold levels for 
participation and are willing to take on extreme risk (ultimate costs, including death or 
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imprisonment).44 These “first actors” are essential to any mass uprising or movement; to them, 
the benefit of being a “hero” and receiving recognition may outweigh the costs of jeopardizing 
their safety or their lives.45  
 During the Arab Spring, costs for individuals may have been the likelihood of 
imprisonment or death for participation; this cost calculation changed as more individuals elected 
to participate in this mass behavior. Simultaneously, the chance of individual repercussions (jail, 
death, etc.) decreased as more and more people engaged in “punishable” actions, and therefore 
the military or the regime would have more difficulty punishing every protester. Beyond costs 
related to personal safety, the cost of inaction – of actively choosing not to participate while 
everyone else in the immediate vicinity was participating – may have been high; the social 
stigmatization of “nonparticipation” may have been enough to incentivize individuals to join 
anti-regime movements.46  
 Individual benefits to be gained from participating in the Arab Spring protests also varied 
and cannot be neatly captured, but ranged from potential recognitions of “heroism” to getting rid 
of a highly resented regime.47 The perception of the government as a common enemy to an entire 
people may have been enough to instigate individual action.48 Individuals may also have 
calculated that the overthrow of their respective governments would be beneficial to them not 
only politically, but economically; entrenched, normalized corruption made it difficult or 
impossible for middle and working-class people to make a living on which they could reasonably 
survive. Indeed, Bouazizi’s death symbolized the impossibility of making a living wage under 
conditions of extreme and prolonged corruption: “Bouazizi couldn’t get a license to sell fruit 
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because he could not afford a bribe. He could not afford a bribe because without a license he 
wasn’t allowed to sell fruit.”49 This vicious, seemingly impermeable cycle of poverty was a 
driving force behind Arab Spring protests demanding more representative governments and more 
opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility. On the whole, benefits to be derived from 
participating in anti-regime protests may have included the accumulation of social capital 
conferred by association with the pro-democracy movement in these nations.   
 
Chapter III: Existing Explanations 
 Several existing hypotheses have been advanced to explain why the Arab Spring occurred 
and why some countries remained resistant both to protest and to regime change. While these 
theories appear persuasive on the surface, they do not withstand the scrutiny of empirical 
evidence and existing data. An overview of these existing hypotheses and their failure to explain 
variation during the Arab Spring uprisings will be provided here. First, the shortcomings of the 
hereditary succession, social media, and diversity hypotheses will be addressed, and then, the 
importance yet incompleteness of the oil wealth explanation will be discussed. Exploring the 
question of why certain countries experienced mass uprisings and even regime change while 
others remained unscathed during the Arab Spring begins to address the puzzle at the heart of 
this thesis. Case studies of Libya, Bahrain and Qatar in a later section will further detail the 
shortcomings of these hypotheses and the contribution of the labor market demographics 
argument in explaining the failure of protests to take hold across the entire MENA region. 
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The Contagion that Wasn’t: Why Succession Cannot Explain Variation 
 One hypothesis in the existing literature is that hereditary authoritarian regimes are 
particularly resistant to change. Jason Brownlee argues that hereditary succession exists in 
nations where rulers do not rely on any type of popular referendum (e.g. elections) to remain in 
power and can transfer rule to an heir (e.g. a son).50 This transfer of power within families often 
maintains authoritarian governments because, according to the theory, established modes of 
succession confer an outward sense of stability: the process of handing off power is not only 
entrenched, but hereditary “transfers signal that the state’s repressive agents have rallied around 
the executive… to an extraordinary degree.”51 Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds posit that  
hereditary regimes that collapsed during the Arab Spring fell not because they were so 
repressive, but “because they were not sultanistic enough.”52  
 However, this theory fails to account for the fact that governments maintained for 
decades by hereditary succession varied in their experiences of the Arab Spring. In several 
countries where mass protest and overthrow occurred, such as Egypt, and in GCC countries such 
as Saudi Arabia alike, authoritarian governments were dominated by “elderly leaders who were 
in ‘impending succession crisis’ and widely believed to be angling to install their progeny as 
successors.”53 The inherent weakness of undemocratic transition from one unelected leader to 
another – Seif al-Islam, son of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and Gamal Mubarak, son of Hosni 
Mubarak in Egypt are notable examples – made the Arab Spring uprisings particularly well-
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timed and may have contributed to their successful toppling of regimes in these countries.54 
However, the GCC monarchies and oligarchies headed by similarly aging autocrats remained 
intact; Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah was estimated to be 90 years old at the time of the Arab 
Spring,55 so the ruling Al Saud family would have been selecting and grooming a successor.56 
Furthermore, hereditary succession did not necessarily predict which regimes would collapse due 
to the defection of the coercive apparatus. In some cases, such as Egypt, the military eventually 
defected from the Mubarak government,57 while in other cases, such as Saudi Arabia, the 
military not only remained loyal to the civilian government, but also intervened in Bahrain on 
behalf of Saudi Arabia’s interests.58 Thus, hereditary succession does not account for variation 
during the Arab Spring uprisings.  
  Hereditary succession itself does not differentiate regimes that did or did not experience 
anti-government uprisings during the Arab Spring, and some regimes with hereditary power 
handoffs in place succumbed to protests while others did not. More specifically, monarchy as a 
particular form of hereditary succession is not a sufficient condition to avoid protest. In Jordan, 
mass uprising did occur and the Jordanian monarchy made a “tactical offering of important 
liberalizing concessions to protesters” in order to remain in power without a sustained 
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challenge.59 Therefore, there must be another political and economic explanation for why so few 
protests and zero regime changes occurred in the GCC.  
  
Coordination Problems, Social Media, and the Role of Al Jazeera 
 How thousands of individual cost-benefit analyses yielded participation in anti-
government movements that toppled some regimes and left others in a perpetual state of civil 
war requires further exploration. This leads to a discussion of how mass mobilization during the 
Arab Spring overcame coordination problems. Much of the literature emphasizes the role of 
social media and the internet as significant explanatory variables in the Arab Spring’s contagion 
and how individuals coordinated their action to form mass movements. Eva Bellin argues that 
“social media… enabled the mobilization of collective action in ways that had been heretofore 
impossible in repressive settings.”60 However, this explanation does not withstand scrutiny. Anti-
authoritarian popular protest occurred long before the advent of social media, and social media 
forums generally credited with spreading the Arab Spring, such as Facebook and Twitter, existed 
prior to 2011 and thus do not explain why the Arab Spring protests occurred when they did. 
Tweets and Facebook posts about the Arab Spring uprisings are also unlikely to be representative 
of the myriad disenchanted populations that engaged in mass protests, populations that likely had 
little or no regular internet and social media access to use these resources consistently to spread 
revolutionary attitudes. As one author acknowledges, “the internet has been used as a tool by 
middle-class activists; it has not been the chief factor behind the Arab Spring.”61 This is not to 
say that the internet and social media played no role in accelerating the Arab Spring uprisings, 
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but these modes of communication were not as decisive as many scholars frame them to have 
been.  
 If social media and internet usage powerfully explain observed outcomes, then it would 
be expected that the use of these technologies in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya was 
higher than in the GCC. However, datasets consistently demonstrate that the GCC nations had 
more access to the internet and more widely made use of Facebook and social media than people 
in Egypt, Tunisia or other uprising-affected nations. Existing data concerning both general 
internet usage by percentage of populations and Facebook’s penetration on a country by country 
level do not support this explanation, and anecdotal evidence further confirms that social media 
could not have played the decisive role that the literature suggests.  
 According to data from the  International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) World 
Telecommunication database and reprinted by the World Bank,62 as of 2010, GCC countries had 
more internet users per 100 people (percentage of population) than other MENA nations where 
major Arab Spring uprisings took place and in some cases, toppled governments:  
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Additionally, data collected from Internet World Statistics and mapped by TargetMap, an online 
service that condenses publicly available data on socioeconomic indicators, shows that Facebook 
penetration (the percentage of a country’s population using Facebook) was consistently higher in 
GCC nations than in other MENA countries in the year of major Arab Spring uprisings:63  
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 As Matthiesen notes, “a peculiarity of the Gulf is that social media were used… arguably 
even more so than in Egypt, Tunisia, or Syria. Given the wealth and high standard of living 
across the region… smartphone[s] and access to social media” were widespread in the GCC.64 
These observations are further complemented by anecdotal evidence. On the whole, the Arab 
Spring uprisings were not as neatly planned and organized on social media as many scholars 
have suggested. A 2012 study of the protests found that “organized movements did not drive 
events across the Arab world; the lead role was played by ‘loose coalitions of disparate groups 
and individuals.’”65 In fact, “young revolutionaries would later recall coming across other protest 
marches entirely by accident.”66  
 Here, the concept of protest cycles is useful to explain the growth of Arab Spring 
uprisings. In Egypt (and elsewhere), where uprisings began as “nonviolent tactics” such as public 
gatherings and the government responded with increasingly intense and violent confrontations, 
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protests escalated and spread.67 This escalation was cyclical: the first peaceful protest in Egypt 
took place on January 25, 2011, and police and military personnel responded with brutal force 
while the civilian government shut off internet and mobile phone access.68 In fact, as Danahar 
reports, the Egyptian government had actually “switched the internet off and largely disabled the 
mobile phone network” by Egypt’s major uprising at the end of January 2011.69 Three days later, 
on January 28, 2011, Egyptian protesters escalated in response to violent government 
crackdowns; the “demonstrations around [Cairo] couldn’t communicate with one another, but 
they all knew where they wanted to be, Tahrir Square. Everything else just happened.”70  
 This example powerfully illustrates how protest cycles operated where governments 
escalated in response to civilian protest, and how protests spread and grew without access to the 
internet or social media. Where violence was preemptive by the government to prevent potential 
unrest – such as in Saudi Arabia – and, paradoxically, where the internet remained “on” – 
protests did not forcefully take root to challenge the government in any meaningful way. Thus, 
the actual roles of social media and advanced communication technology should be questioned.  
 A much more compelling case has been made in the literature for the influence of Al 
Jazeera in bringing down individual threshold levels and encouraging mass participation in a 
pan-Arab push for political liberalization. At the forefront of Arab news media, Al Jazeera is an 
international broadcasting network owned and funded by Qatar.71 The role of Al Jazeera was 
influential in “downplaying differences among Arab states… providing a cognitive framework 
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for the dynamic, cascading interaction among protests and revolutions.”72 The creation of a 
shared narrative of struggling against oppression and utilizing strength in numbers against 
tyrannical, unrepresentative rule across the region, uniting all Arab people in a common cause, 
became a dominant driving force of the uprisings.73 However, Al Jazeera is accessible 
worldwide, and given the more widespread availability of communications technologies in the 
Gulf, it is likely that people in the GCC had even better access to Al Jazeera than their rioting 
counterparts in North Africa. Therefore, Al Jazeera and access to information alone cannot 
explain why certain countries did not experience violent turmoil and regime overthrow during 
the Arab Spring.  
 The broad availability of and access to Al Jazeera does helpfully explain how 
coordination was achieved and the free-rider problem overcome in the case of Tunisian, 
Egyptian, Libyan and Yemeni uprisings. The free rider problem, outlined in Mancur Olson’s 
collective action model, posits that since collective action is anything that provides a public, 
collective good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous – in the case of the Arab Spring, more 
democratic governance and improved socioeconomic conditions – rational actors “are motivated 
to free ride on the contributions of others.”74 Why the Arab Spring uprisings that toppled regimes 
appear to have overcome the free rider problem can be explained by Chong’s popular 
mobilization model.75 
 According to Chong’s model, “bandwagon rates (mobilization due to prior success)” are 
modified by the actions of other players in a given protest scenario – in the case of the Arab 
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Spring, discontented citizens (protesters) and authoritarian governments.76 During the Arab 
Spring, individuals in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria gathered that they had 
more to gain from protest than from inaction, and thus engaged in collective behavior at ever-
increasing rates; individuals in these contexts evaluated their participation in and goals of the 
movement as more valuable than the costs.77 Al Jazeera, not necessarily the internet or social 
media, publicized and spread news of prior successes across the region, and encouraged 
mobilization for a common, pan-Arab sense of purpose and identity. With Al Jazeera’s indirect 
help, a critical mass of individuals made the calculation that a liberalized state would be an 
improvement over the status quo, despite potential costs, and thus, it was “economical for [them] 
to contribute” to collective actions.78 Enough people chose not to free ride that the Arab Spring 
uprisings both occurred and in some contexts, effectively ended the harsh rule of tyrannical 
autocrats.  
 
The Diversity Argument 
 Another existing argument is that homogenous societies are inherently more stable than 
heterogeneous ones, and therefore, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity can explain cross-
regional variation during the Arab Spring. Proponents of this alternative argument would point to 
Bahrain (discussed in depth in a later section) for its religious divides, Libya’s tribal divisions, 
and Egypt’s sectarian violence as evidence that cleavages and cross-cutting diversities are 
reliable predictors of unrest. This alternative argument is severely limited in its explanatory 
power for a few reasons. First, diversity exists everywhere and varies in kind, but the Arab 
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Spring, and protests more generally, did not and do not occur everywhere. There are potential 
axes of division in all MENA nations, including GCC states; diversity in terms of socioeconomic 
status, religious beliefs, and political affiliations can divide any society.  
 Second, the Arab Spring was avoided entirely by some very diverse Middle Eastern 
countries, such as Lebanon.79 Lebanon is home to Shia and Sunni Muslims, a sizable Christian 
population, and is a site of refuge for thousands of intra-regional refugees.80 Therefore, the 
heterogeneity argument does not meaningfully or adequately explain regional variation during 
the Arab Spring uprisings.  
 
Oil 
 Oil economics is another prominent existing explanation for why certain countries 
withstood the Arab Spring uprisings. Unlike hereditary succession, social media, and diversity 
arguments, the oil hypothesis is not inaccurate, but merely incomplete. As presented, the oil 
hypothesis is elementally correct – oil wealth does matter to stability and regime staying power – 
but not in the way currently theorized. Instead, oil wealth is important for the labor market 
exigencies it creates, and the labor markets and the demographics that result in oil-rich MENA 
nations are useful in explaining regional variation during the Arab Spring uprisings.  
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 Michael Ross argues that nationalized oil resources in the MENA region have not only 
allowed authoritarian leaders to remain in power, but have shored up the stability of these 
regimes for several reasons:  
“First, it has allowed them to buy off citizens by providing them with many benefits with 
virtually no taxation… Second, autocrats who get most of their funding from national oil 
industries find it easier to keep their countries' finances secret… Finally, oil wealth 
allows autocrats to lavishly fund - and buy the loyalty of - their armed forces.”81 
 
By this logic, governments with massive natural resources use this wealth to buy the passivity of 
their people. On some level, this occurred in the context of the Arab Spring. Several Gulf 
countries used their astounding oil and natural resource wealth to buy off opposing factions; in 
Saudi Arabia, “the king announced massive spending programs… made possible by high oil 
prices to weather the storm,”82 in Kuwait, the “government announced a grant of US$3,500 to 
every [citizen], as well as a year’s worth of free staples such as sugar, cooking oil, and milk,” 
and in Qatar, the government “declared that it would raise public-sector salaries and pensions by 
60%, at a cost of more than $8 billion.”83 
 However, resource wealth alone is insufficient to explain variation in social mobilization 
during the Arab Spring. Libya is considered oil-rich, but experienced massive uprising, 
government overthrow and regime collapse.84 Similar to ruling autocrats in the Gulf, Gaddafi 
“used oil wealth and his own unique brand of populism to keep Libyans atomized while building 
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up a vast coercive apparatus;”85 the Libyan regime “funnel[ed] much of its oil wealth into public 
handouts.”86 That the Libyan government deployed its riches from resource wealth to coerce the 
Libyan people into passive acceptance of the regime suggests that there is more to understanding 
protest diffusion than oil wealth in the MENA region.  
 The following data gathered from the Central Intelligence Agency’s ranking of countries 
by oil production (in billions of barrels) highlights why oil wealth does not neatly correlate with 
experience of uprising or regime overthrow during the Arab Spring:87 
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Country Name World Rank in 
Oil Production 
(of 211 nations) 
GDP (2013)88 Oil Wealth as 
Percent of GDP 
(2010-2014)89 
Oil Wealth 
per Capita† 
Saudi Arabia 2 $748.4 billion 45.8% $11,889.25 
Kuwait 6 $175.8 billion 53.8% $28,073.70 
United Arab 
Emirates  
7 $402.3 billion 21.9% $9,426.89 
Libya 9 $74.2 billion 52.3% $62.57 
Qatar  12 $203.2 billion 12.1% $11,335.73 
Oman 22 $79.66 billion 37.2% $8,159 
Bahrain 68 $32.89 billion 19.4% $4,790.29 
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Qatar, which experienced no major uprising, let alone regime overthrow,90 is ranked lower in 
terms of oil production – and thus reliance on resource wealth – than Libya, a country that 
collapsed entirely during the Arab Spring. Oil wealth is thus no longer a consistently strong 
indicator of the likelihood of stability; Dubai, one of the seven emirates of the UAE, which is 
one of the wealthiest GCC nations that experienced no uprising, is not as oil rich as other areas 
(e.g. Libya), but employs hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of migrant laborers in 
construction projects.91 Oil wealth is still important to explaining the Arab Spring uprisings 
because the oil industry and the projects born of it, such as large-scale construction, are largely 
the reasons why the Gulf states employ migrant labor on such massive scales. Therefore, oil 
wealth is still significant, but not in the way that the literature currently posits. Resource wealth 
on its own is not sufficient to explain variation, but the labor force demographics created by the 
exigencies of resource-rich nations usefully fill this analytical void.   
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Chapter IV: The Hypothesis, Causal Mechanisms, and Evidence 
 
“As paradigms fall and theories are shredded by events on the ground, it is useful to recall that 
the Arab revolts resulted not from policy decisions taken in Washington or any other foreign 
capital, but from indigenous economic, political and social factors whose dynamics were 
extremely hard to forecast.”92 
 
 
The Hypothesis 
 
 The demographics of the labor forces in the Gulf states consistently separate the GCC 
nations from other MENA countries. Political indicators such as authoritarianism, hereditary rule 
within families, and the absence of democratic infrastructure are common to all nations across 
the region, with the exceptions of Israel and Turkey. Similarly, oil wealth does not meaningfully 
distinguish the GCC from non-GCC nations that experienced massive uprising and government 
collapse; Libya is an oil-rich nation. Therefore, as the previous section more extensively 
reviewed, existing hypotheses that posit that these indicators can meaningfully explain regional 
variation during the Arab Spring uprisings are inadequate.  
 On the surface, it appears that the Arab Spring can be explained by unemployment. 
Nations with high unemployment rates, such as Egypt and Tunisia, were decimated by the Arab 
Spring uprisings.93 Explanations for the problem of unemployment and its role as a driving force 
of the Arab Spring have rested on the issue of bulging youth populations without meaningful or 
sustainable opportunities for upward social mobility; absent means of gainful employment, youth 
in particular took to the streets to demand better from their governments.94 Missing from this 
narrative is why such unemployment problems existed in these countries and not in other MENA 
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nations at this particular historical moment. The Arab Spring uprisings would obviously not have 
occurred without thousands of individuals coming together and engaging in collective action 
with a common purpose. A “shared fatigue with authoritarian rule” may be the underlying 
emotional impetus that drove many people across the region to take to the streets and protest 
tyrannical rule, harsh treatment, and economic hardship, 95 but such systems of oppression 
existed in this region for decades, so why did the Arab Spring occur when and where it did? 
Since unemployment and fiscal indicators had been problems for years in these countries, these 
factors by themselves do not explain the timing, occurrence, or variation of the Arab Spring. 
Labor force demographics in the Middle East help to fill this analytical gap.   
 The independent variable in this hypothesis is a sizable non-Arab, mainly Asian migrant 
worker population. “Sizable” in this context is considered to be 50% or more of a country’s labor 
force.96†† The presence of this variable, which is consistent across the GCC nations, likely helped 
to produce the dependent variable, a lack of political, anti-government protests and in turn, 
regime stability through the course of the Arab Spring. In countries where this independent 
variable was absent, massive protests, regime overthrow, and in some cases, civil war, took 
place.  
 The labor force demographics hypothesis explains the overall lack of protests in the GCC 
countries for several interrelated reasons. First, in the GCC nations, there were reduced 
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incentives to protest, and the demographics of these countries’ labor forces are proxies for these 
reduced incentives. Those with the political capital to credibly challenge the government by 
massive, anti-regime social mobilization – citizens of GCC nations – lack the immediate 
motivation to do so because they benefit from the regime status quo: a continuous supply of 
cheap migrant labor from Asia. This cheap migrant labor is indicative of low domestic 
unemployment because migrant laborers fill jobs that GCC citizens do not want or would not do 
themselves; such levels of migrant laborers comprising the GCC workforce suggests that GCC 
citizens are well enough off to be able to refuse to do the menial jobs for which migrant labor is 
heavily imported.97  
 While in some contexts foreign labor migration may be seen as a threat to domestic job 
markets and economies, the Asian migrant labor force in the Gulf is recognized as “pivotal to the 
impressive and rapid transformation of the region’s infrastructure.”98 In fact, the Asian migrant 
labor force recruited by the kafala system in the GCC – a form of labor sponsorship between 
employers and migrant employees discussed at length later on – does the jobs that are considered 
“beneath” Gulf citizens, and therefore GCC nationals would not do these jobs regardless.99 
Additionally, immigrant populations are politically, economically and socially segregated from 
Gulf nationals, so the idea that labor migrants are “invading” the space of GCC citizens is not 
necessarily accurate.100 Citizens in Gulf countries benefit so much from the kafala system and 
the migrant labor that it recruits that it would not be in their general interests to do anything to 
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unseat or upset this system; the kafala system provides Gulf employers with a steady supply of 
cheap, exploitable labor and the recruited migrant workers do jobs that otherwise would not be 
filled by citizens. Thus, the benefits that GCC citizens derive from migrant labor is dependent on 
the kafala system itself. 
 Second, cost-benefit analyses regarding the decision to protest in the GCC countries 
likely led individuals to calculate that the cost of protesting outweighed potential benefits not 
only because the economic and political status quo is largely favorable to most GCC citizens, but 
also because migrant laborers frequently protest in these countries and these regimes crack down 
rapidly and violently against protesters, thus raising the cost of engaging in such behavior. 
Intolerance of protests in these regimes means that governments are ready to crack down to 
punish such behavior if and when it arises. Since migrant laborers in these nations regularly 
strike and protest unfair treatment, consequences of this behavior are swift and harsh: migrant 
laborers who organize and stage collective strikes or protests are imprisoned, deported, or killed. 
By way of demonstration effect, the costs suffered by migrant laborers who protest are warnings 
to GCC citizens against engaging in similar behavior for fear of facing the same consequences. 
 As the theory of regime change cascade notes, “demonstration effects also worked in the 
opposite direction, driving [GCC] countries’ leaderships to crack down. Saudi Arabia actually 
helped other regimes brutally suppress revolutionary dissent.”101  Some Gulf countries such as 
Saudi Arabia cracked down preemptively on their populations in the wake of the Arab Spring, 
stemming the tide of protest diffusion to these countries and helping to short-circuit potential 
uprisings against the government.102 After protests in Tunisia ignited similar behavior in Egypt 
and other MENA countries, the threat of the Arab Spring spreading to the GCC prompted 
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preemptive action by authoritarian Gulf states. This preemption radically changed any potential 
cost-benefit analysis of individuals in the Gulf contemplating engaging in collective behavior. In 
the context of protest intolerance, the regime is ready to crack down against popular 
demonstrations whenever and however they manifest. 
 The threat of violence against potential protesters was not the GCC’s only source of 
reverse-demonstration effect scare tactics; the consequences of migrant laborers’ non-
government sanctioned, anti-institutional protests demanding better treatment were observed by 
GCC nationals for years, and the costs of such behavior – prison or worse – were effectively 
outweighed by potential benefits. The readiness and brutality of regime crackdowns against 
frequent migrant labor protests are significant because these costs of protesting in these contexts 
deter other potential protesters from engaging in this behavior. Labor protests by migrants are 
met with police violence, and in the case of some domestic workers in the Gulf, sexual assault.103 
While it could be argued that since migrant laborers are fundamentally disenfranchised actors 
without real agency in the context of GCC nations where they are forced to work in inhumane 
conditions, the consequences they suffer for protesting would not necessarily deter GCC 
nationals, who have more political agency, from engaging in similar behavior against their 
governments. However, as will be discussed later in this section, people in the GCC during the 
Arab Spring did have the inclination to protest – they created and joined online petitions and 
social media pages that aimed to organize anti-regime activities – but were deterred from 
actually taking to the streets. The demonstration effect of migrant laborers’ protests and the 
consequences they suffered help to explain why these online movements largely failed to 
materialize as actual mass protests.  
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 It is further significant to note that in countries without Asian migrant labor populations, 
protests not only took root, but gained the support of thousands of disenchanted citizens and in 
some cases, toppled regimes and began civil wars. The absence of this explanatory variable is 
thus important to the occurrence, course, and outcomes of mass protests in the Arab Spring. In 
countries with substantial Asian migrant labor populations, labor force demographics and the 
resulting political dynamics in these nations short-circuited Arab Spring protest diffusion to the 
GCC countries. Where potential protesters had reduced incentives to demonstrate and where the 
regime regularly, publicly, and harshly put down labor strikes and protests by migrant workers, 
mass anti-regime collective action did not successfully manifest. This overall lack of meaningful 
challenge to the existing authoritarian power structures in these countries can be traced to the 
presence of sizable Asian migrant labor populations and what these labor force demographics in 
turn indicate about these countries. 
 
Proposed Causal Mechanisms 
 At least two causal mechanisms underpin this hypothesis. The first is the demonstration 
effect. Asian migrant workers in the Gulf states are lured by promised opportunities of relatively 
high-paying jobs in oil and construction industries, but they are subjected to inhumane conditions 
upon their arrival. Most of these Asian migrants come to work in the Gulf via the kafala system, 
which is a form of agreement with Asian labor-sending countries that, as will be discussed in 
more detail in later parts of this section, tie migrant laborers to their employers, stripping them of 
their passports and withholding their pay to severely constrain or eliminate their mobility within 
the Gulf.104 Thus, Asian migrant workers often strike to demand better living and working 
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conditions. These strikes lead to disastrous consequences for the migrant laborers; often, labor 
protest participants are jailed, deported or killed. By way of demonstration effect, migrant 
laborers’ protests function as a warning to Gulf populations that may have been considering 
protesting against their respective governments; the consequences for protests are so harsh in 
those countries, and Gulf citizens have clearly much more to lose from protesting than migrant 
laborers do, that the real costs of protesting for Gulf citizens outweighed potential benefits. The 
comments of UAE labor minister Ali al-Kaabi best summarize this causal mechanism: on the 
topic of rioting Asian migrant laborers, he said, those migrant laborers “‘would be deported… 
[they] will be used as a lesson to others’” who may have been contemplating similar behavior.105 
This sentiment reflects the theoretical underpinnings of the demonstration effect at work during 
the Arab Spring: harsh punishment for a specific activity was made public in order to 
disincentivize other groups from engaging in the same behavior. 
 The only Gulf country that does not employ the kafala system and thus has more lenient 
policies governing migrant laborers is Bahrain. Historically, unlike other GCC nations, Bahrain 
has allowed labor unions to form.106 This difference between Bahrain and the rest of the Gulf 
helps to explain why Bahrain did experience major protests that the Saudi Arabian army 
quashed.107 Asian migrant laborers had less to protest in Bahrain, thus the demonstration effect 
was not as strong in Bahrain as in other GCC nations. The particularities of the Bahraini case 
will be discussed further in the case study section of this thesis.  
 The second causal mechanism that demonstrates why a sizable non-Arab migrant labor 
population helps to explain variation in political unrest is the issue of unemployment. While 
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unemployment has been offered in the existing literature to explain the onset and spread of the 
Arab Spring uprisings, the root cause of unemployment in non-GCC MENA countries, and by 
contrast, the relatively low levels of unemployment in the GCC, is a more nuanced argument that 
requires exploring labor force demographics. Unemployment was high in the non-GCC nations 
at this historical moment because unskilled labor from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria had been 
imported to the Gulf states until the GCC nations changed their labor preferences; Asian migrant 
labor supplanted intraregional migrant labor, thus leaving former labor-sending MENA countries 
with major unemployment problems. The literature cites several reasons for the GCC nations’ 
shift in preferences from Arab to Asian migrant workers. In sum, GCC nations began to favor 
Asian migrant labor because workers from non-Arab states were easier to recruit, coerce and 
control; Asian migrant workers do not generally speak or understand Arabic and are thought to 
pose less of a political threat to internal security and stability in GCC countries.108   
 In the remainder of this section, relevant data and anecdotal evidence will be marshaled 
to demonstrate the significance of the labor force demographics hypothesis, these proposed 
causal mechanisms, and how they operated during the Arab Spring.   
 
 
Why Labor Markets?: Data and Empirical Evidence 
 
  While the causes of the Arab Spring uprisings “are numerous and complex, [they] have 
been exacerbated by the region’s underlying demographics.”109 Unlike other variables – such as 
oil wealth – labor market demographics dominated by non-Arab migrant workers consistently 
correlate with countries that did not experience massive uprising in the Arab Spring. According 
to existing datasets, non-Arab (mostly Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, and Indonesian) foreigners 
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comprise approximately 50% or more of GCC countries’ labor forces, and approximately 40% of 
these countries’ total populations.110 One report estimates that the influx of Asian migrant 
workers swelled to “40 million by 2005,” accounting for “the most rapid population growth 
anywhere in the world during that period.”111 
  Second, the GCC has undergone a fundamental shift in labor preferences. Before the 
onset of the Arab Spring, countries such as Egypt and Tunisia sent labor to the oil-rich and 
construction industry-heavy GCC countries. However, GCC nations have shown a preference for 
non-Arab migrant workers, most of whom come from South Asia. There are several reasons for 
this preference change: first, GCC governments worried about migrants from other, more 
politically “liberal” Arab nations coming to their countries to work and in turn, spreading anti-
government concepts.112 In Qatar, for example, hundreds of Egyptian workers were forcibly 
returned to Egypt in 1996 when Qatar accused the Egyptian government of attempting a coup.113 
Second, in the post-1970s oil boom, GCC demands for cheap labor outpaced other Arab nations’ 
supplies, and Asian governments have constructed formal agreements with GCC nations – the  
so-called kafala system,114 whereby Asian labor became more accessible and cheaper in GCC 
countries.115  
 The kafala system is understood as a form of sponsorship: employers or governments 
“sponsor” laborers’ visas to enter and remain in GCC countries; the employer then controls the 
sponsored workers’ abilities to leave the country, often by retaining their passports and work 
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visas.116 This system was originally intended to provide short-term migrant labor to oil-exporting 
countries, but in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the Second Iraq War, during which times the 
GCC countries expelled millions of Arab laborers from geographically proximate countries 
interpreted to be linked and/or sympathetic to the crises, demand for Asian migrant labor 
increased exponentially.117 Misleading potential workers with promises of high wages, labor 
recruiters in Asian countries offer to pay the cost of laborers’ travel to GCC nations, and allow 
laborers to repay this loan with interest over time; in reality, “the result is virtual debt 
bondage.”118 Upon arrival in their GCC destination, migrant laborers’ visas are taken as 
collateral by their employers, and their wages are kept sufficiently low as to prevent them from 
the ability to repay their “loans” with interest in a timely manner.119 This dynamic keeps laborers 
tethered to employers and to exploitative conditions; migrants who do not speak Arabic often 
sign agreements that they cannot understand that commit them to years of low wages without 
recourse.120 The kafala system is sustainable despite these “bait and switch” tactics because even 
the promise of employment in the Gulf is often better than the status quo in some Asian labor-
sending countries.121 
 Two interrelated causal mechanisms illustrate how labor force demographics of the GCC 
explain variation in social movements across the MENA region during the Arab Spring, and why 
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the GCC countries remained relatively stable throughout this time period. These mechanisms and 
their operation will be discussed in turn in this section.  
 
Protests and the Demonstration Effect 
 In order to analyze the demonstration effect’s operation in this context, data on protest 
activity in the GCC and in some Arab Spring-affected MENA nations was collected. The aim of 
this data is to gain a better understanding of protest patterns and behavior in the region over a 
period of time, and to see if labor-related demonstrations by migrant workers could have 
operated as a deterrent. In order to understand if and how labor-related demonstrations and their 
aftermath affected anti-government activity in these nations before, during, and after the Arab 
Spring, data was retrieved from the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT), 
an online research tool that collects news and media reports about events and incidents 
worldwide and generates download-ready spreadsheets by keyword and location searches.122 
These GDELT searches were run for every GCC country and, for the purposes of comparison, 
two of the non-GCC MENA nations that experienced massive protest and regime collapse – 
Egypt and Libya. 
  Country-specific searches were conducted as follows: the data range was limited by date 
from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2012 to include time before, during, and immediately 
after the major Arab Spring uprisings. For each GCC nation, in addition to Egypt and Libya, the 
following search criteria, as specified on the GDELT site, were completed as such for labor-
related protests: Initiator = “Labor,” Recipient Country = “Country Name,” Event Code = 
“Protest,” Event Location = “Country Name.” Running searches with these parameters yielded 
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the graphs below, labeled respectively. To create graphs of government-related protests by 
civilians, searches for the same set of countries were limited by the same date range, and the 
following search criteria were completed as such: Initiator = “Civilian,” Recipient = “Country 
Name,” Recipient Type = “Government,” Event Code = “Protest,” Event Location = “Country 
Name.” These searches yielded the following results: 
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 At best, this data must be read as approximations of real events; GDELT data is only as 
accurate as the online and print media that it compiles and searches. Independent research on 
online databases of news media, such as Lexis Nexis, further supports this contention: searches 
for labor protests in Qatar between 2005 and 2012 yielded more than one incident.  Additionally, 
some of the data that GDELT gathers may be duplicates, which is to say that the same event may 
be reported by various news sources and thus be counted more than once by GDELT as separate 
4 4 6 7 10 
176 
42 
0 0 0 0 0 
17 9 0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
200 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
N
um
be
r 
of
 P
ro
te
st
s 
Year 
Labor Protests in Egypt and Libya, 2005-2012 
Egypt 
Libya 
4 
52 
6 
17 
1 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
2009 2011 2012 
N
um
be
r 
of
 P
ro
te
st
s 
Year 
Anti-Government Protests in Egypt and Libya, 
2005-2012 
Egypt 
Libya 
Stern 42 
events. It is also important to note that GDELT does not provide more detailed information on 
the complexities of the identities of actors in a given event – for example, who is protesting 
against what or whom, the fact that some workers are citizens while others are migrants/non-
citizens, etc. Therefore, since some areas and countries are more widely and reliably covered by 
reporters than others, and since every event that occurs in every country, especially those that are 
toxic to the media, cannot reasonably be expected to be recorded and the same event may be 
cited by GDELT multiple times, GDELT data serves as an imperfect mode of approximating 
events. Data from GDELT is nonetheless useful because it overcomes the logistical concern of 
gathering information on the instances of protest in this region of the world; given time and 
budget constraints, data from GDELT is preferable to not citing any data at all. Additionally, this 
data provides both an overview of temporal trends in protest behavior and events within 
countries in this region.  
 Overall, the data cited throughout this section are at best approximations for two reasons. 
First, it is extremely difficult to count and to capture the number of protest events and individual 
migrant laborers in any country, but especially in the GCC nations; not only are many migrant 
workers undocumented, but GCC countries are considered “black boxes” – they rarely divulge 
potentially sensitive information. This is related to the second reason that this data should be 
considered approximations: many GCC nations do not regularly report unemployment statistics 
or other relevant fiscal data to the World Bank or similar international bodies. Thus, this data 
cannot be considered completely accurate, but rather a best estimate given logistical constraints.   
 Cursory glances at these graphs provide some basic understanding of the impact labor 
protests likely had on anti-government mass movements in the GCC. The sheer number of labor-
related protests is clearly larger than instances of protest against governments in most GCC 
Stern 43 
countries. In fact, according to this data, most of the GCC did not experience any instances of 
anti-government protest from 2005 to 2012. If every GCC country is understood to be politically 
repressive, then laws that prohibit speaking out against the government in these nations do not 
fully explain why some countries experienced anti-government uprising over this time period 
while others did not. This phenomenon highlights why labor force demographics and labor 
strikes are significant, and how the demonstration effect may operate in this situation. 
 The demonstration effect posits that the observable behavior of a given group and the 
consequences of that behavior can meaningfully impact another group’s inclination to act 
similarly in a comparable context. Native Arab populations (i.e. nationals) of the Gulf countries 
were deterred from protesting and mass collective action because the large Asian migrant worker 
populations in these countries organized, mobilized and staged strikes often and unsuccessfully 
in the years preceding and during the Arab Spring.123 Governments’ and corporations’ abilities to 
quash (with the use of violent force) these protests and the negative consequences that followed 
for the protesters showed the national Arab population – who, unlike the migrant workers, would 
be salient political actors challenging their government – that to do so would be both dangerous 
and futile.124 By way of cost-benefit analyses, citizens of the GCC nations calculated that, 
despite any anti-government sentiment or inclination to protest, to engage in similar behavior 
would be too risky, but for migrant laborers who are completely politically disempowered, such 
behavior is their means of asserting agency in an oppressive situation. Unlike GCC citizens, 
migrant workers calculate protest participation to be more beneficial than leaving their status quo 
unchallenged.  
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 All of the GCC nations experienced some form of labor-related protest in the 2005-2012 
period, but only half of these countries also experienced some form of anti-government protest. 
Of the few cases of anti-government protest that GDELT searches yielded, what is coded as 
“anti-government protest” may not actually be citizens of a particular country making demands 
for change in their government. For example, the singular anti-government protest in the UAE 
after several labor-related protests reported in years prior merits further explanation. This protest, 
according to GDELT data, occurred in December 2008. According to the United States 
Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in order for political protests to take place 
in the UAE, they must first be approved by the government.125 This particular instance of 
“government” protest – what is probably better understood as government-approved protest – 
were gatherings of people demonstrating against the conflict in the Gaza Strip.126 Therefore, this 
protest did not present a major challenge to the UAE government itself; non-government 
sanctioned protests by workers in the UAE and the consequences of these public displays of 
collective action likely persuaded UAE citizens not to protest their government, if citizens were 
so inclined to stage a mass movement against the Emirates’ rulers.  
 Multiple reports of Asian laborers protesting in the UAE support this analysis. In 2006, 
several reports surfaced about collective action by migrant laborers in the UAE, especially in 
Dubai.127 Migrant workers, many of whom came from India and Pakistan to Dubai to work on 
the city’s construction projects, were “angered by low salaries and mistreatment,” and they 
protested to demand better wages and more humane working conditions.128 One estimate 
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concludes that Asian migrant workers in the UAE staged over “two dozen strikes” in a single 
year… mainly in Dubai.”129  
 In November 2007, a similar event occurred: thousands of migrant laborers staged a 
strike at a construction worksite in Dubai.130 Authorities arrested “about 4,000 protesters… and 
more than a dozen [were] deported.”131 In 2008, over a thousand migrant laborers in Dubai 
staged a protest over wages, only one month after “45 Indian construction workers” were jailed 
for the same behavior.132 Thus, the demonstration effect essentially “warns” those with 
something to lose – UAE citizens who judge anti-government protest to be too personally and/or 
politically costly – against such behavior, but poor, politically powerless migrant workers assess 
that jail, deportation, or physical harm could not be worse than their conditions that mimic 
indentured servitude.  
 The demonstration effect mechanism hinges on deterrence, which means that for the 
consequences of migrant laborers’ protests to dissuade Gulf citizens from protesting, GCC 
nationals would have had to have the inclination to protest their governments in the first place. 
Evidence that this inclination existed comes from online petitions and Facebook groups calling 
for GCC citizens to participate in protests and mobilize against their respective governments. In 
the UAE, an online petition calling for political liberalization and open elections was widely 
circulated.133 In fact, the petition became so popular that online activists promoting and 
publicizing the petition and its message were arrested and jailed as “extremists” charged with 
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crimes against the state.134 Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, “over ten thousand people had signed up 
on Facebook to participate in a Day of Rage,”135 but no one actually took to the streets.136 As will 
be discussed further in the case study section of this thesis, a similar Facebook page existed 
calling for mobilization in Qatar, but no anti-government protest occurred.137 What is common to 
all of these countries and what also separates them from non-GCC nations where protests did 
occur is discontented, exploited Asian migrant laborers that dominate the domestic workforce in 
each of these nations; these migrant workers strike and protest frequently, facing serious and 
often brutal consequences. The experiences of the migrant laborers in the GCC warned Gulf 
nationals not to engage in the same behavior; thus, Gulf citizens’ social media movements did 
not manifest as protests on the streets.  
 
Explaining Saudi Arabia and Oman 
 The cases of two GCC nations – Saudi Arabia and Oman – are worth discussing in 
greater detail. Labor protests in Saudi Arabia appear to spike in 2012 after remaining low or 
relatively constant in prior years. It is worth noting that these protests occurred after Saudi 
Arabia intervened in Bahrain to quash the anti-government liberalization movement there. 
Additionally, all forms of free expression are punishable by prison sentence in Saudi Arabia; 
according to an Amnesty International report, several cases of what the Saudi government may 
term a “protest” related to labor or other grievances may just be small groups of people 
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demanding fair treatment, distributing “state-banned books,” or merely identifying as a member 
of the minority Shia population.138  
 The demonstration effect operated in Saudi Arabia in a very unique manner. In October 
2011, Chinese laborers in Saudi Arabia staged a protest; these workers went on strike from a 
“rail construction project.”139 In response, Saudi officials arrested those involved in the strike.140 
Despite this instance of public consequences of protest, in several Saudi Arabian provinces 
outside of major cities, Shia minority groups protested against the government, resulting in 
crackdowns on several local demonstrations to signal that to engage in such behavior is more 
costly than beneficial.141 Protesters “from the Shia minority in the Eastern Province dared defy 
the [protest ban].”142 The willingness of Shia communities to protest despite known danger likely 
stemmed from “discrimination that Saudi Shia endure, which effectively makes them second-
class citizens.”143 In fact, “a dangerous spiral of protest, repression and public funerals” 
maintained the fervor of Shia protests in Saudi Arabia.144 Thus, the cost-benefit analysis for the 
populations actually engaged in these protests was fundamentally different; it is unlikely that 
Shia protesters would have been dissuaded by the consequences faced by protesting migrant 
laborers. In the case of an attempted, more centrally-located and mainstream protest that may 
have actually threatened the Saudi regime, “only one protester, Khalid al-Juhani, showed up and 
was arrested” for attempting to demonstrate – alone – in Riyadh.145 In Saudi Arabia on the 
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whole, the demonstration effect successfully repressed anti-government collective action that 
would meaningfully challenge the entrenched authoritarian regime.  
 Oman is also a particular case. Of the six GCC nations, “Oman was the first… to 
experience popular protests in January 2011.”146 In Oman, “the 2011 protests were largely 
directed against an oligarchy perceived as corrupt and misleading the country.”147 One 
particularly contentious issue was the failure of the government to hire Omani nationals for work 
on developing an industrial center in Sohar; protests were “sparked off after young unemployed 
people were told that there would be no job opportunities for them.”148 It is worth noting that, as 
will be discussed in a later sub-section, Oman had the highest domestic unemployment rate of 
any GCC nation, and thus was perhaps already more prone to protest than the other GCC 
member countries. In response to unrest, the sultan of Oman met some of the demands of his 
people – including the creation of thousands of jobs and an increase in minimum salaries – but 
did not make any major or meaningful changes to the government itself.149 
 
Egypt and Libya: At the Heart of the Arab Spring 
 Protests in Egypt and Libya greatly departed in number, intensity, and outcome from 
those in the select few Gulf states that experienced some unrest. It is clear that more reporting 
was done on Egypt than on Libya during this time period, perhaps because of the initial 
magnitude of the protests and regime overthrow in Egypt immediately after protests began in 
Tunisia, or perhaps because of Egypt’s proximity and relationship to Israel, America’s key ally 
in the MENA region and a source of international fixation, or a combination of political, 
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diplomatic and economic concerns that made Egypt particularly compelling to news sources. A 
clear pattern emerges in this data: in both Egypt and Libya, protests related to labor and anti-
government movements peaked in 2011, the height of the Arab Spring. Labor protests in Egypt 
are worth exploring further, and actually contribute to a causal mechanism that helps to explain 
why labor force demographics matter to variation in anti-government uprisings throughout the 
MENA region during the Arab Spring.  
 
Economic Preconditions: Unemployment and Fiscal Indicators  
 Historically, Egypt was a labor-sending country to GCC economies. In the 1970s, the 
GCC accepted migrant labor from within the MENA region, generally from countries with little 
or no oil wealth and without means of employing their populations.150 However, labor 
preferences in the GCC shifted due first to the drop in oil prices in the 1980s, when oil-producing 
countries scaled back their work forces, and then again in the 1990s when oil production once 
again became lucrative.151 At this point, Asian labor-sending countries designed a formal system 
with GCC labor-receiving governments; Asian labor forces “became a major export item” to 
GCC countries.152 Thus, former labor-exporting states, including Egypt and Tunisia, were left 
with exacerbated unemployment problems, which fueled protests in these nations.153 As Hussain 
and Howard note, “access to jobs may have been a primary source of discontent in Arab Spring 
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countries, particularly in countries… where the formal unemployment rates topped 15 percent… 
countries with weak protest had low unemployment rates.”154  
 Labor-related protests in Egypt are therefore hardly surprising in the 2005-2012 time 
period. Labor protests in Egypt had reached a level of “normalization” in the mid-2000s: 
“Between 2004 and 2008, more than 1.7 million [Egyptian] workers participated in contentious 
collective actions” that were ignored or met with no consequences.155 Unlike in the GCC, 
organized labor unions are legal in Egypt, and thus collective action by workers is not punished 
to the degree that it is in the GCC; in fact, such labor-related protests in Egypt are expected.156 
Additionally, at this particular historical moment, unskilled labor from the poorer, less developed 
MENA countries that was formerly exported to the GCC nations to work on oil and construction 
projects was supplanted by Asian migrant workers under the kafala system; these laborers are 
easier to manipulate due to linguistic and cultural barriers, and have less regional mobility than 
Arab migrants from within the MENA states, thus helping to explain the GCC’s general 
preference for non-Arab migrant labor.157 This shift in labor preferences helps to explain the 
timing and location of the Arab Spring uprisings; unemployment alone, without consideration of 
the underlying labor force demographics and the kafala system that explain unemployment 
figures, does not wield adequate explanatory power.  
 Unemployment figures for several MENA nations that experienced unrest and/or regime 
collapse during the Arab Spring contrast with those of the GCC nations:158 
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Source: World Bank, Unemployment (as % of labor force) 
Without employment opportunities within their respective countries or in the nations that 
formerly employed Arab migrants, anti-government protesters in these MENA nations demanded 
reforms; in particular, youth (especially young men) and young adult populations in these 
countries that are now “more educated and less employed” than earlier generations took to the 
streets in the hopes of achieving liberalization and upward social mobility.159 Ironically, 
however, previous attempts at economic liberalization in both Egypt and Tunisia “created a new 
class of super-wealthy entrepreneurs,” as opposed to more equal societies with increased 
opportunities on the whole.160    
 Among the Gulf nations, only Saudi Arabia’s unemployment rate increased over the 
period of the Arab Spring (by 0.8%); all other GCC countries’ unemployment rates remained 
constant or decreased over this period. In order to attract and maintain such sizable migrant labor 
populations, GCC nations must have major industry – oil and construction are key examples. 
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Low domestic unemployment coupled with a major industry (e.g. oil or massive construction 
projects) that attracts these workers to a guaranteed job with promised income explains the 
overwhelming presence of migrant labor in these countries.161 Low domestic unemployment 
further aids in illustrating why political unrest did not spread throughout the GCC because salient 
political actors in these countries – citizens/nationals – are less likely to protest a status quo that 
is financially rewarding. A combination of economic preconditions – low domestic 
unemployment and industry that requires cheap, unskilled labor forces – is a mechanism that 
explains why and how the GCC countries created and sustained such labor force demographics, 
and in turn how these demographics contributed to the overall stability and regime staying power 
of GCC countries relative to the non-GCC MENA nations that experienced massive protests and 
unrest during the Arab Spring.  
 The sheer number of non-Arab migrant workers in the GCC nations is difficult to 
measure accurately, but estimates of the total populations of these workers in the Gulf suggest 
the staggering impact they have on the labor forces in these countries. The table below, adapted 
from Baldwin-Edwards, approximates foreign migrant worker populations in the GCC 
countries:162 
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While these numbers may overestimate workers in the kafala system in these countries – these 
estimates may include skilled foreign workers who do not participate in construction or oil 
sectors – this data is still useful to approximate the sheer volume of migrant labor in the GCC. 
Clearly, the GCC nations have attracted sizable foreign, mostly Asian, migrant labor populations 
to conduct “the more unappealing kinds of labor on which any society depends” and on which 
oil-rich nations heavily rely,163 and have all maintained relatively low or negligible levels of 
unemployment throughout and since the Arab Spring.164 It is worthwhile to note that no parallel 
migrant labor force exists in other MENA countries, including Libya, which is considered by the 
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CIA to be among the top ten oil producing nations in the world.165 The Migrant Rights Research 
Centre (MRRC), an organization devoted to “advancing the rights of migrant workers throughout 
the Middle East,” does not report on any non-Arab migrant labor populations in countries such as 
Libya, Egypt or Tunisia.166 MRRC profiles labor-sending and labor-receiving countries in this 
region; one of its only mentions of Egypt is as a labor-sending nation to Kuwait (in the late 
1970s),167 and another cites Egypt as a destination for refugees from Gaza.168 In various reports 
on Asian migrant populations in MENA, only the GCC countries are mentioned as destinations.  
 A corollary to this causal mechanism is the importance of fiscal preconditions. Several 
scholars agree that particular economic conditions, especially high levels of unemployment, 
contributed to the onset of anti-government protests and conflicts during the Arab Spring. 
Tracing how labor markets as a proxy of economic conditions vary across the region is thus a 
useful mode of understanding how and why political unrest did not overwhelm the GCC.169 
According to World Bank data, all of the GCC countries are considered high-income non-OECD 
nations:170  
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Country GDP (as of 2012-13) Population 
Bahrain $32.79 billion 1.332 million 
Kuwait $183.2 billion 3.369 million 
Oman $80.57 billion 3.632 million 
Qatar $202.5 billion 2.169 million 
Saudi Arabia $745.3 billion 28.83 million 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) $383.8 billion 9.346 million 
Source: World Bank, High Income Non-OECD Country Profiles 
 Gulf countries have a certain set of fundamental economic preconditions, including high 
levels of income, that create a sense of stability that attracts migrant workers to these countries as 
opposed to other resource-wealthy nations. For comparison, Libya is an oil-rich nation but is 
considered “developing” and is characterized by the World Bank as “upper-middle income.”171 
Together with political climate, high levels of per capita income lead migrant laborers to believe 
in possibilities of obtaining wealth in these nations, however misplaced their aspirations are due 
to the gap between what workers are promised and the realities of migrant labor conditions in the 
GCC nations.172  
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Chapter V: Three Cases 
 
 The case studies in this thesis have been selected for their important variation on key 
independent and dependent variables of interest. First, the case of Libya will be reviewed to 
highlight the shortcomings of the existing hypotheses that purport to explain the Arab Spring. 
Then, the experience of Bahrain will be reviewed and analyzed in anticipation of potential 
criticism of the hypothesis proposed in this thesis; despite its membership to the GCC, Bahrain’s 
major protests, it will be shown, do not undermine the labor force demographics argument 
presented here. Finally, the case of Qatar is outlined as a “positive” example that powerfully 
illustrates the importance of labor force demographics in understanding variation in the Arab 
Spring uprisings.  
 
The Failure of Existing Hypotheses: The Case of Libya  
 
 The collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime in Libya calls several existing 
hypotheses that aim to explain the Arab Spring into question. Specifically, Libya’s oil wealth and 
Gaddafi’s apparent selection of his son, Seif al-Islam, to succeed him as heir to the Libyan 
government speak to the inadequacy of the oil and hereditary succession hypotheses, 
respectively.  
 In power for over four decades, Muammar Gaddafi created a regime that deprived 
Libyans of “all freedom of expression, political debate and normal civil society. The cult of 
Gaddafi went much deeper than that of any other Arab dictator.”173 Muammar Gaddafi rose to 
power in Libya by military coup that ousted the Libyan King Idris in September 1969.174 Gaddafi 
became an absolute ruler, consolidating his control over civilian government and the Libyan 
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military, adopting the title of Colonel.175 In his infamous Green Book, Gaddafi spelled out his 
opposition to the idea of democratic government; he rejected “all forms of representation” in an 
attempt to shore up his authoritarian rule and to legitimize his tyrannical use of power.176  
 Over the course of one week in February 2011, protests that began in Benghazi infected 
major cities across Libya; by February 20, 2011, anti-government rebels had seized control of 
Benghazi and were threatening to topple the Gaddafi regime. Not only were protests in Libya 
ignited by events in Egypt and Tunisia, but the arrest of a lawyer who had “represent[ed] the 
relatives of prisoners killed in the 1996 [Abu Salim] prison massacre”177 – an attempted prison 
break that resulted over a thousand inmates’ deaths by armed guards – actually accelerated 
Libya’s protest movement.178 One month later, NATO forces began a targeted intervention in 
Libya, and in October 2011, Gaddafi was captured and killed in Sirte.179  
 As the events of the Arab Spring illustrate, Gaddafi’s regime was anything but invincible. 
Gaddafi had created “one of the most repressive regimes in the Arab world,” but failed to 
withstand the force of popular protests.180 The implosion of Gaddafi’s totalitarian rule calls the 
oil and succession hypotheses for explaining regional variation during the Arab Spring into 
question because Libya, like GCC nations, had both oil wealth and a regime based on autocratic 
hereditary rule, but experienced massive unrest and eventual collapse. 
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 Libya is an oil-rich nation, ranked among the top ten oil producing countries in the 
world.181 Thus, the argument that oil wealth indicated stability and relative safety from massive 
protest and overthrow during the Arab Spring is, at best, an oversimplification. Gaddafi failed to 
utilize his country’s oil wealth in ways that “provid[ed] social services, and direct[ed] the 
development of dependent private sectors.”182 This was perhaps due to Gaddafi’s personalistic 
use of his country’s oil money, wealth that he claimed as his “personal fortune.”183 In fact, the 
Libyan people were generally impoverished despite their country’s sources of massive wealth: 
“Oil sustained [Gaddafi’s] madness” to the detriment of his people.184  
 Additionally, Libya never attracted a sizable (or notable) migrant worker population from 
the Asian labor-sending states; the overall absence of non-Arab migrant workers in Libya 
illustrates the country’s instability, despite its wealth and the potential for there to be sectors 
seeking to employ cheap migrant labor. First, no such opportunities existed because, unlike in 
the GCC, oil wealth in Libya was not utilized to develop other industrial complexes, such as 
construction. Gaddafi mismanaged the oil sector in order to “use the country as a grand 
laboratory, frittering away cash as each hare-brained experiment took his fancy.”185 Second, the 
haphazard nature of Libya’s oil economy and resource wealth abuse by Gaddafi and his 
immediate cronies likely made it rather difficult for the Libyan government to create any 
bilateral agreements with labor-sending countries in Asia; these agreements sustain the kafala 
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system in the GCC and thus supply the Gulf with its migrant workforce.186 Gaddafi’s reputation 
as an international pariah probably made such “diplomatic” agreements extremely unlikely to 
achieve and to sustain.187 
 On the topic of hereditary succession, Gaddafi’s sons were long thought to be groomed to 
succeed their father.188 Gaddafi had selected his son, Seif al-Islam, as his heir to perpetuate the 
regime,189 and there was no meaningful or apparent alternative to the entrenched power structure 
that Gaddafi created after his military coup.190 Despite Seif al-Islam’s public “rejection” of his 
role as heir to his father’s regime, he was his father’s political right hand, “act[ing] as his father’s 
official spokesman”191 and aiding Muammar Gaddafi “in the brutal suppression of Libya’s 
uprising.”192 While Libya degenerated into civil conflict, Seif al-Islam “vow[ed] to continue the 
war and retake his father’s capital [from rebel forces].”193 His actions as a political and 
diplomatic figure in Libya, and his assertions of power that have recently resulted in his 
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indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, cast doubt on whether he really 
would have refused the position for which his father was preparing him.194  
 As the case of Libya illustrates, the theory of hereditary succession as a determinant of 
regime stability in the context of the Arab Spring does not withstand close scrutiny. After 
protests in Tunisia and Egypt unseated authoritarian regimes, Libyan protesters similarly 
organized against their government and ended – rather mercilessly – the Gaddafi rule.195 The 
case of Libya highlights that this hypothesis fails to explain why some hereditary regimes 
survived while others succumbed to protests and unrest.  
 
Bahrain: Exception to the Rule?  
 Unlike the other GCC nations, Bahrain experienced anti-regime protest that may have 
threatened the country’s political status quo during the Arab Spring. The Saudi Arabian military 
responded to and put down these protests, and the Bahraini king ultimately remained in power.196 
The most notable of these protests occurred on February 16-17, 2011 at the Pearl Roundabout in 
Manama, the capital city of the small island nation of Bahrain, a short distance from the large 
and powerful country of Saudi Arabia.197 The nature of this protest against the Al Khalifa ruling 
family deserves further attention due to the particularities of the nation of Bahrain.  
 While this instance may be read as an exception that undermines the hypothesis presented 
in this thesis, Bahrain is a much more nuanced case that does not fundamentally challenge the 
labor force demographics hypothesis. First, Bahrain, unlike the other five GCC countries, does 
not employ the kafala system; this means that migrant laborers in Bahrain are arguably more free 
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and thus have fewer reasons to protest than their counterparts in GCC countries with the 
oppressive kafala system.198 In 2008-2009, Bahrain became the only GCC country to repeal the 
kafala system of sponsorship and allow migrant workers to change employers or to resign once 
they arrived in Bahrain.199 Bahrain adopted this liberalized policy in order to “place a ceiling on 
the number of expatriate workers in Bahrain;” clearly, no other GCC country has much interest 
in limiting its supply of cheap migrant labor.200 By extension, this means that the demonstration 
effect was weaker (or nonexistent) in Bahrain than in other GCC countries where strikes by 
migrant laborers were consistently struck down with force. Additionally, Bahrain has a more 
diversified economy than other Gulf nations, and relies less on migrant labor than other GCC 
countries whose economies are built on oil and construction industries.201 
 On a related note, protesters in Bahrain did not necessarily demand the end or total 
destruction of the ruling regime. As Matthiesen notes, demands were more moderate than those 
in the protests exploding in Egypt and Tunisia; in Bahrain, protesters took “the slogan that had 
galvanized protesters in Cairo and Tunis (‘The people want the fall of the regime’) but 
substitut[ed] islah (reform) for isqat (fall).”202 While these protests are still noteworthy, they 
were neither as violent nor as extreme in their demands as those in non-GCC nations. It is 
apparent that the demands of the mostly-Shia protesters in Bahrain were generally more 
moderate than those of protesters in Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya because the Shia population in 
Bahrain had a core cluster of concerns that affected their livelihood – for example, more equal 
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housing and job opportunities and an end to favoritism of the Sunni minority.203 Although 
protesters in Bahrain did, in some cases, make more extreme demands – such as the dissolution 
of the 2002 constitution – Bahraini protesters’ generally moderate demands are likely the result 
of their relative contentedness with their status quo versus the lived realities of their counterparts 
in non-GCC countries.  
 That demands for reform in Bahrain were more moderate may reflect that protesters in 
Bahrain realized the impossibility of achieving larger change; the risk of protest, especially by 
the disenchanted Shia majority, was clear, but not enough to deter mass movement by a religious 
majority ruled by a minority altogether. The overall genesis of the protests in Bahrain suggests 
that Bahrain was a categorically different case than the non-GCC MENA countries where mass 
movements were more successful.204 
 Another aspect of the case of Bahrain that is worth noting is that Sunnis control the 
government, but the majority of the country is Shia.205 The sectarian nature of the protests in 
Bahrain further distinguish them from demonstrations in non-GCC nations. The conflict between 
the ruling Sunni minority and the Shia majority that view “themselves as indigenous Bahrainis” 
is significant to explaining the specific circumstances of the protests in Bahrain.206 Religious 
disagreement between the citizenry and the government was thus another reason for uprisings 
that occurred in Bahrain but not elsewhere in the GCC. The majority of the populations in GCC 
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countries is Sunni, but of the 2 million Shia in the GCC, most live in Bahrain.207 The following 
table depicts the distribution of the Shia population in the GCC: 
Country Percentage of Population Identifying as Shia 
Bahrain 60-70 
Kuwait 20-30 
Oman <5 
Qatar 10 
Saudi Arabia 10-15 
UAE 10-15 
Source: Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 3.  
Tensions between Sunni and Shia Bahrainis have run high in the small country for decades,208 
and stem from many centuries of conflict over religious practices and the resentment of the ruled 
toward the ruling family.209 The Arab Spring in Bahrain involved “Shia protesters… 
demand[ing] job opportunities and democratic changes in government… the police attacked 
these demonstrators with tear gas and rubber bullets.”210 When this mode of protest suppression 
did not work, Bahrain welcomed thousands of Saudi troops onto the island to quell the 
demonstrations.211  
 The sense of cultural and religious “otherness” that separated the majority of Bahraini 
citizens from their government thus made repression of protests by Bahraini and Saudi military 
forces easier; the “military’s willingness to shoot on civilians, facilitated by the ‘otherness’ of the 
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protesters (mostly Shia in contrast to the Sunni ruling family and military elite) and reinforced by 
Saudi military support, constituted the major difference between this case and that of the first 
comers, Tunisia and Egypt.”212 Thus, despite Bahrain’s migrant labor population, its internal 
politics and religious turmoil between the ruled Shia majority and the ruling Sunni minority 
made it uniquely poised to become infected with the contagion of the Arab Spring. The Bahraini 
regime was threatened, but not overthrown, by popular protest. The particularities of this case, 
therefore, cannot completely undermine the labor force demographics hypothesis.   
 
Qatar: A Positive Case 
 A small yet incredibly powerful GCC nation, Qatar’s experience of the Arab Spring was 
a complex one. Qatar is consistently ranked the richest nation in the world per capita, surpassing 
geopolitical giants such as the US, the EU, and China.213 It is estimated that approximately 90% 
of Qatar’s labor force is made up of non-national migrant workers, most of whom are from 
Asia.214 Qatar’s booming oil economy, paired with its massive construction sector – at the heart 
of which are current projects for the 2022 FIFA World Cup – attract and sustain such a huge 
migrant labor force.215 Qatar is a useful example to illustrate how the labor force demographics 
hypothesis operated in Gulf nations during the Arab Spring, and how this particular element 
influenced variation in anti-government protests at this historical moment.  
 Qatar employs the kafala system and enforces it ruthlessly: in Qatar, employers 
“routine[ly] confiscat[e]… [migrant] worker’s passports” and wield “inordinate control over 
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their employees.”216 The poor working and living conditions that migrant workers in Qatar face 
lead them to protest frequently; there are laws against unionization and striking in Qatar, like in 
other GCC nations, so the punishment for public demonstrations is severe.217 Migrant workers 
who strike are jailed, deported, or face violence.218 These policies and consequences for mass 
protest effectively deterred Qatari nationals from engaging in demonstrations themselves; the 
costs were too high and the benefits too uncertain to participate in such behavior.  
 In Qatar, Asian migrant workers had been striking for years before the Arab Spring 
occurred. In 2006, “over 2,000 workers… struck… and protested at their labor camp in Qatar 
demanding an increase in salary.”219  Such behavior has resulted in jail and deportation of 
migrant workers who participate in these protests. The consequences of protests effectively 
deterred future protests by Qatari nationals.  
 It could be argued that since migrant workers are not citizens of Qatar and lack any 
political capital to meaningfully challenge the Qatari regime, the consequences of their behavior 
would not influence the willingness of Qatari nationals to protest themselves; the punishment for 
the same behavior by migrant workers and citizens would likely be different. However, any 
behavior interpreted to be anti-regime in Qatar, regardless of who performs the action, is subject 
to a jail sentence. In the context of the Arab Spring, Qatari poet Mohamed Rashid al-Ajami was 
given a life sentence for writing a poem that “[spread] incendiary material” that challenged the 
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regime.220 If this was the consequence for writing a poem, the punishment for public 
demonstration would assumedly only be more severe.   
 There is evidence that such revolutionary spirit existed among the people of Qatar during 
the Arab Spring, but that they were effectively deterred from taking to the streets. In February 
2011, a Facebook page called “The Freedom Revolution” was created to “[call] for a revolution 
against the regime of Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Aal Thani. Its organizers [were] 
protesting against the corruption rampant in the regime and the absence of real political and party 
life in Qatar.”221 This particular page received thousands of likes, and other similar pages also 
gained followings.222 However, no such revolution ever materialized in Qatar, no protest or mass 
mobilization took place, and the regime remained intact and unchallenged.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusions and Implications  
  
 The puzzle that this thesis has aimed to address is why the Arab Spring uprisings 
unevenly affected the MENA region. Much of the existing scholarship is preoccupied with the 
question of why the Arab Spring occurred in the first place, as opposed to why and where 
uprisings either never took root or why, in some cases, they failed so miserably. One of the goals 
of this thesis is to fill this identified analytical gap.  
  The proposed answer to this question that this thesis puts forth is that labor market 
demographics in the six Gulf Cooperation Council nations usefully explain why these countries 
experienced little or no mass protest movement during the Arab Spring. Existing hypotheses that 
posit the significance of hereditary authoritarianism, the role of social media, diversity, and oil 
wealth in explaining variation during the Arab Spring protests fail to capture the entire story. 
Hereditary authoritarian governments and reliance on oil wealth characterized MENA nations 
that succumbed to Arab Spring protests (e.g. Libya) and unaffected countries (e.g. Qatar and the 
UAE) alike, and therefore do not explain the absence of protest in much of the GCC. This is not 
to say that oil wealth is unimportant, but that it does not explain variation in the Arab Spring 
uprisings in the ways currently argued. Oil wealth was used to “buy off” potentially discontented 
populations in Libya and the GCC, and therefore the use of natural resource wealth to buy 
loyalty cannot explain the Arab Spring uprisings.223 Additionally, social media cannot explain 
variation by itself; social media and internet usage penetrated much more of the GCC nations’ 
populations than countries such as Egypt or Libya, where uprisings overthrew regimes.224 The 
diversity argument is similarly unsatisfactory; political, cultural, socioeconomic and religious 
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diversity exist across the region, but the Arab Spring only manifested as protests in a select few 
countries. In fact, some of the more diverse nations in the MENA region, such as Lebanon, 
avoided the Arab Spring entirely. While no single explanation is perfect, these hypotheses miss 
crucial elements of the cross-regional variation in protest occurrence and success during the Arab 
Spring.  
 This thesis hypothesizes that labor market demographics meaningfully and usefully 
differentiate between countries that did or did not experience protest during the Arab Spring, and 
can explain the absence of protest in almost all of the GCC countries. According to this 
hypothesis, the presence of non-Arab, Asian migrant worker populations in the GCC countries in 
huge numbers helps to explain variation in protests across the MENA region during the Arab 
Spring for at least two reasons. First, these migrant labor populations in the GCC protest and 
strike frequently; this behavior is met with violent and harsh consequences. By way of 
demonstration effect, the punishments suffered by migrant workers for protesting deterred GCC 
citizens from protesting themselves. As Facebook pages and social media campaigns calling for 
“revolution” in these countries show, the inclination to protest GCC governments existed,225 but 
GCC nationals did not, with the exception of Bahrain, take to the streets in attempts to overthrow 
their respective governments. GDELT data on protest occurrence in these countries supports the 
contention that labor protests and strikes by migrant workers served to deter GCC citizens from 
protesting themselves. The cost for GCC citizens to protest their governments was too high, and 
would not outweigh the potential benefits; for migrant laborers who are completely socially, 
politically and economically disempowered in these contexts, the costs of protesting are 
calculated to be more favorable than their status quo.  
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 Second, the presence of Asian migrant labor in the GCC in such huge numbers – in every 
GCC country, Asian migrant workers make up 50% or more of the labor force – has meant that 
intraregional migration for jobs in the GCC has slowed or stopped.226 GCC nations historically 
hired unskilled labor from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and the other poorer MENA countries, but have 
recently shown preference for Asian migrant labor for a number of reasons; Asian migrant 
workers are thought to pose less of a political threat to GCC countries, and are more easily 
coerced and controlled due to linguistic and cultural barriers.227 This shift in labor preferences 
left thousands unemployed in former MENA labor-sending countries, and helps to explain why 
protests occurred in those countries but not in most GCC nations. Thus, there is an important 
difference between what this thesis offers as a causal mechanism and what the existing literature 
posits is significant about unemployment and fiscal indicators in explaining the Arab Spring; 
unemployment existed in non-GCC MENA countries at this particular historical moment due to 
the shift in the Gulf’s labor preferences from intraregional unskilled labor to Asian migrant 
workers. The kafala system and the labor it supplies to sustain major industries are thus at least 
somewhat responsible for the GCC’s high-income status. Thus, labor force demographics help to 
explain why Gulf citizens were relatively more content with their status quo compared to their 
non-GCC counterparts, why they had fewer reasons to mobilize, and why regimes in the GCC 
remained virtually undisturbed by the Arab Spring.  
 The case studies presented in this thesis highlight variation in independent variables of 
interest. The case of Libya is significant because, as an oil-rich, non-GCC nation that 
experienced massive unrest, Libya’s lack of a sizable Asian migrant labor force helps to explain 
protests and regime collapse. Libya shared important explanatory variables with the GCC 
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countries – a hereditary authoritarian mode of government and oil resources – but lacked a 
sizable migrant labor force and thus the demonstration effect that accompanies migrant labor 
protests.   
 Additionally, Bahrain is an important case because, as a GCC nation that experienced 
massive protests in which the Saudi Arabian military intervened on behalf of the Bahraini 
regime, it could be argued that the case of Bahrain undermines the labor force demographics 
hypothesis as the case of Libya undermines existing alternative hypotheses. However, Bahrain 
differs from the other GCC nations in two very important respects: it does not employ the kafala 
system, and its Shia majority is governed by a Sunni minority. Since Bahrain does not use the 
kafala system to recruit and coercively retain migrant laborers, Asian migrant workers in Bahrain 
are relatively more free to unionize and move around between employers than their counterparts 
in other GCC nations, and thus would be less likely to protest than migrant workers in other 
GCC nations that ruthlessly employ and enforce the kafala system.228 This, in turn, weakens the 
demonstration effect that migrant worker protests would have had on citizens’ inclinations to 
mobilize. Second, the Shia/Sunni tensions in Bahrain separate it from the other GCC nations, 
where the majority of both citizens and rulers are Sunni. Religious and cultural clashes in 
Bahrain made it particularly ripe for protest; these protests failed largely because the government 
and the coercive apparatus in Bahrain regarded the protesters as “others” and thus it was easier 
for the regime to crack down harshly against its people.229  
 Finally, the case of Qatar is presented to show how the labor market demographics 
hypothesis operated in a GCC nation. In Qatar, as made clear by Facebook activity, people had 
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the inclination to protest but never actually took to the streets against the Qatari government.230 
This can be explained by the consequences suffered by migrant laborers in Qatar who protested 
for better wages and working conditions; Qatari citizens realized that the cost of protesting 
would be outweighed by any potential benefits, especially because many people in Qatar derive 
major advantages from a consistent supply of cheap migrant labor.  
 There are several implications of this research. First, protest diffusion is a complex, 
multivariable phenomenon. Political and cultural similarities between neighboring countries are 
not sufficient to predict that protest will diffuse across nations; contagion requires more than 
geographic proximity and baseline sociopolitical commonalities. The idea that “a wave of mass 
mobilization swept the broader Middle East, toppled dictators, and cleared the way for 
democracy” has not been and likely will not be borne out.231 The failure of the Arab Spring 
uprisings to result in democracy across the MENA region is not simply a lack of mobilization, 
but a consequence of entrenched economic practices, including the exploitation of migrant labor 
forces and intolerance of protest that accompanies the presence of these populations. Stemming 
the tide of contagion via the demonstration effect and the use of preemptive crackdowns is 
important to consider when studying the potential for protests to take hold cross-regionally.  
 A second and perhaps more significant implication of this research is that labor markets 
and their compositions have important political consequences. In the case of the GCC, labor 
force demographics helped to deter citizens from protesting against their respective 
governments; in addition to preemptive anti-protest measures and existing statutes intolerant of 
popular demonstrations, the presence of Asian migrant worker populations in the GCC 
effectively helped these nations avoid destabilizing mass mobilization. Labor force 
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demographics alter population compositions and intra-national relations, and in turn have 
significant consequences for political behavior.  
 The way forward for the MENA region is, at best, unclear. As cross-regional variation 
during the Arab Spring illustrates, the disappearance of authoritarian governments and in turn, 
transitions to democracy, no longer seem so assured. A sustained shift away from Asian migrant 
labor exploitation is doubtful; international talks on improving the human rights of these migrant 
laborers in the GCC have not yet resulted in any meaningful changes, and it does not appear that 
they will in the future.232 If the GCC’s reliance on exploited migrant labor persists, the cycle of 
demonstration effect and protest intolerance will likely continue unabated, and thus challenges to 
the GCC regimes from below seem unlikely in the foreseeable future. It appears as though 
Huntington’s waves of democracy no longer crash as loudly or unfailingly; the tide seems to be 
going out.233   
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Appendix – GDELT Data 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Ant-Government Protests in the GCC, 2005-2012 
Year Country Name Number of Protests 
2007 Saudi Arabia 1 
2008 Saudi Arabia 2 UAE 1 
2009 Bahrain 1 
2011 Bahrain 7 
2012 Saudi Arabia 1 
 
Year Country Name Number of 
Protests 
2005 Kuwait 1 UAE 4 
2006 UAE 3 
2007 
Bahrain 2 
Oman 1 
Qatar 1 
Saudi Arabia 4 
UAE 14 
2008 
Bahrain 7 
Kuwait 4 
UAE 2 
2009 
Bahrain 4 
Kuwait 5 
Saudi Arabia 2 
UAE 4 
2010 
Bahrain 1 
Saudi Arabia 2 
UAE 2 
2011 
Bahrain 8 
Kuwait 3 
Oman 10 
Saudi Arabia 6 
UAE 5 
2012 
Bahrain 6 
Kuwait 7 
Oman 1 
Saudi Arabia 14 
Labor-Related Protests in the GCC, 2005-2012 
 
 
Labor Protests in Egypt and Libya, 2005-2012 
 
 
Anti-Government Protests in Egypt and Libya, 2005-2012 
 
 
  
Year Country Name Number of Protests 
2006 Egypt 4 
2007 Egypt 4 
2008 Egypt 6 
2009 Egypt 7 
2010 Egypt 10 
2011 Egypt 176 Libya 17 
2012 Egypt 42 Libya 9 
Year Country Name Number of Protests 
2009 Egypt 4 
2011 Egypt 52 Libya 17 
2012 Egypt 6 Libya 1 
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